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Abstract:  In many developing countries the rural poor often depend on patrons to act as brokers 
in order to get public provision from the government. The broker facilitates provision in return for 
securing peasants’ votes for politicians. Yet, low bargaining power of peasants allows patrons to 
appropriate public resources for themselves. I propose increasing peasants’ bargaining power by 
connecting them to markets outside their village. Making use of a natural experiment found in the 
construction of a motorway in Pakistan, I find public provision to be significantly higher in 
connected villages when compared to those isolated. Moreover, I find that the beneficial impact of 





Literature on economic development places considerable emphasis on state provision as a 
means of enhancing the welfare of the poor and reducing inequality.1 Despite this concern, 
however, in many developing countries public funds are often channelled through local ‘elites’, 
rather than directly reaching the poor.2 One reason for the reliance on local elites is that democratic 
                                               
1 Public provision here refers to any good or service provided by the government to its citizens. This could be 
in the form of private, club or public goods. It can be universal or highly targeted provision. I use the terms 
public provision and state provision interchangeably.   
2 This holds in countries with democratic and semi-democratic institutions. See for example Medina and 
Stokes 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Fox 1994; Auyero 2000; Brusco et al. 2002; Levitsky 2001; 
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institutions in developing countries are often young and unreliable, thereby restricting politicians’ 
ability to make credible pre-election promises.3 Attempts to mitigate this disadvantage often 
involves politicians approaching local people of influence to act as brokers with poor constituents, 
thus leading to the establishment of an exchange relationship where politicians offer material 
benefits to local elites – meant for both elites and their clients – in exchange for political support.  
There is significant evidence on this form of ‘political clientelism’ in many developing 
countries.4 Rather than looking at dyadic patron-client relationships, as in traditional work on 
clientelism,5 this literature focuses on the triadic relationship between politicians and their poorest 
constituents through the mediating role played by brokers. Here, politicians are patrons for local 
elites by providing access to public resources in exchange for political support, whereas local elites 
are patrons for the poor and can act as brokers to allow their clients access to resources from 
politicians. These networks can be so pervasive that Auyero notes how political clientelism takes 
centre stage in most studies on political engagement of the poor.6  
An important implication of these networks is that the poor are dependent on aligning with 
someone of influence in order to benefit from public provision. However, aligning with an 
influential does not guarantee public provision. As Stoke et al. note, brokers yield considerable 
power in their local community and engage in this relationship with the intention of extracting 
                                                                                                                                                           
Roniger 2004 for a more recent take on the literature. A good compilation on the older works on clientelism 
can be found in Schmidt et al. 1977. 
3 See generally, Keefer 2007. 
4 This is a generalised definition of political clientelism. See Stokes et al. 2013 for a good overview of the 
literature. See also the references in footnote 1. As Medina and Stokes 2002 and Roniger 2004 note, there is 
no agreed definition of clientelism, resulting in considerable variation and debates regarding the concept. 
This paper does not attempt to add to this debate and therefore uses a relatively broad definition.  
5 For classic works on clientelism, see particularly Scott 1977 and Powell 1970. 
6  Auyero1999. While a considerable portion of the literature on political clientelism focuses on Latin 
America, it can be applied, with some variation, to most developing countries.  
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benefits.7 Therefore, where possible, they will try to appropriate resources from the government for 
their own private use rather than channelling them to their clients. In extreme cases of exploitation, 
brokers manage to appropriate most public resources for themselves in exchange for delivering 
clients’ votes to politicians.8  
The question then is: why do the poor allow brokers to appropriate funds secured on the 
bases of their votes? While the literature on political clientelism has extensively analysed the 
relationship between politicians and local influentials, there is limited understanding of the 
relationship between local influentials and their clients.9 In particular, there is little systematic 
evidence on how local influentials distribute public resources placed at their disposal and what 
factors influence the chances of poor households’ receiving public funds.  
This paper starts to fill this gap in a rural setting, where patrons are the local landlords and 
clients are peasants. As others before me, I draw attention to the inelasticity of demands that 
peasants make from landlords and how asymmetric bargaining power enables patrons to appropriate 
public resources for their own use when acting as brokers between the poor and the government. 
And whereas traditional solutions to this exploitative exchange have focused on redistribution,10 
this paper draws inspiration from Basu’s seminal work on rural monopoly power where he argues 
that landlords’ ability to exploit peasants stems not from inequality alone, but from the interaction 
of inequality with isolation. It is the interaction of the two that results in particularly exploitative 
forms of clientelism.11 To use the framework of Hirschman, clientelism can thereby be seen as an 
                                               
7 Stokes at al. 2013. See also Camp 2012. 
8 Author 2012b; Keefer 2004; Powell 1970; Scott and Kerkvliet 1977. 
9 Auyero (1999) commented how, at that time, the literature made limited attempts to add to our 
understanding of how clientelism worked at the grassroots. Since then few studies have attempted to do this. 
Susan Stokes and Anund Krishna are two of the main contributors in this field. 
10 Ranging from policies such as progressive taxes, to welfare schemes and to land reforms, these tend to be 
contentious and thus difficult to implement (Herring 2005). 
11 Basu 1986. 
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institution which "arouses but ignores voice while it would be responsive to exit".12 This means that 
clients need effective 'exit' options in order to make patrons more responsive to 'voice' when 
brokering public provision.  
This paper studies one such exit option: opening up a village to the wider economy. 
Reducing isolation should alter relative bargaining powers, thereby increasing the competition that 
landlords face for the services provided by peasants. While there are a number of ways to achieve 
this, I explore the effect that connectivity, through road networks, has on previously isolated rural 
economies. Previous work has shown that connectivity increases bargaining power of peasants13  
and, for that reason, reduces the ability of local patrons to block collective action among peasants.14 
By the same logic, connectivity should also force local patrons to offer their clients increased public 
provision if they want to maintain their influence in the rural economy.15  
Making use of a natural experiment in the form of a motorway constructed in Pakistan in 
1998, this paper demonstrates that while public resources are always channelled through local 
brokers, provision to the poor is higher in villages connected to the external market. Unlike in 
isolated villages, patrons in villages close to the motorway can no longer demand clients’ political 
loyalty without delivering significant public provision in return.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 1 briefly describes a typical 
politician-landlord-peasant network, focusing in particular on the low bargaining power of peasants 
vis-à-vis their landlord in the presence of inequality and isolation and how that influences political 
outcomes. Section 2 tests the theoretical framework using data from rural Pakistan to evaluate the 
                                               
12 Hirschman 1970, 123. I would like to thank Lauge Poulsen for highlighting the relevance of Hirchman’s 
theory for this study.  
13 Author 2012a.  
14 Author 2012b.  
15 Scott and Kerkvliet (1977) argue that any change in the environmental setting of the relationship should 




impact of connectivity on clientelist networks. The analysis makes use of four types of villages 
varying based on their distance from the motorway (close v. far) and levels of inequality (landlord 
dominated v. egalitarian). I find that, while in isolation, public spending is significantly lower in 
villages dominated by large landlords when compared to relatively egalitarian ones. However, once 
connected to the external economy, outcomes in the differently tenured villages converge to the 
benefit of the rural poor. Section 3 concludes. 
 
1. Politician-Broker-Peasant Networks and Public Provision 
 
In many developing countries state failure, coupled with inequality, has meant that the poor 
are forced to approach local elites in order to satisfy many of their basic needs. This is particularly 
true in rural economies, where the problem is exacerbated by lack of access to markets. Often this 
has resulted in the establishment of clientelist relationships. Born out of necessity and mutual 
benefit, these are relationships between groups of unequals.16 On the one hand the network consists 
of the local patron – typically a landlord – with command over resources which he can offer to 
clients – typically peasants - to satisfy their economic, social and political needs.17 Clients, on the 
other hand, own few assets and are therefore vulnerable to fluctuations in their environment.18 In 
exchange for access to the patron’s resources they offer him a reliable source of cheap labour,19 add 
                                               
16 Mason 1986; Powell 1970; Scott and Kerkvliet 1977. 
17 These range from goods and services such as housing, employment, credit, dispute resolution, protection 
from exploitation and access to government officials and resources. See Bardhan 1980 for a good overview. 
18 Powell 1970. 
19 In an agrarian economy, where the demand for labour tends to be seasonal, a reliable source of workers is 
very valuable during harvesting and sowing seasons.  
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to his social standing and, most importantly for this paper, offer political support by agreeing to 
vote in accordance with the wishes of the landlord.20 
The rate at which these goods and services are reciprocated is determined by relative 
bargaining powers. By definition, of course, the patron has the upper hand as the needs of the asset-
poor clients tend to be relatively inelastic, while those of the patron are desired but by no means life 
threatening.21 Peasants, while having significant value for the patron in the aggregate face a classic 
collective action problem due to which their individual value remains low.22 The bargaining power 
of an individual peasant depends on the needs he aims to fulfil through the patron, the number of 
other clients with whom he has to compete for patronage and the amount of alternatives he has for 
fulfilling his needs. Thus, clients who are economically independent can negotiate better terms from 
the exchange, whereas poor and destitute clients may receive little more than subsistence.23 
One of the services that landlords demand from peasants is a guarantee that they will vote in 
accordance with their political preferences. Once promised clients are unable to renege on their 
commitment as the close-knit nature of small towns and villages in developing countries often 
makes it unlikely for voting decisions to remain hidden, and non-compliant behaviour would be 
reported by operatives.24 Mason and Joshi argue that this holds true even in the presence of formal 
assurances by the government of ballot secrecy, as clients have no precedence of secret balloting 
and therefore, have no reason to believe such assurances.25  This gives the landlord control over a 
                                               
20 Scott and Kerkviet 1977. See also Ahmad 1977; Rouse 1988; Scott and Kerkvliet 1977, Powell 1970, 
Auyero 1999. 
21 Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980. 
22 Mason 1986. 
23 Waterbury 1977. 
24 Stokes 2004. My own experience doing field research was similar. Villagers thought of voting as a 
communal activity, carried out based on consultations with fellow peasants and under the direction of the 
local landlord. 
25 Mason and Joshi 2008. 
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vote base that he can trade with politicians in exchange for access to public resources. These 
resources are used both to improve his own well-being and to strengthen his patronage network by 
offering ‘rewards’ to those peasants who have relatively stronger bargaining power within the 
network. The result is the establishment of the politician-broker-peasant relationship, where the 
local landlord acts as the middleman between politicians and their rural constituents.  
There are clear benefits for politicians to engage in this relationship. Firstly, as politicians 
are often unable to make credible electoral promises in young democracies, they need to align with 
someone whose promises voters believe. Local patrons, because of their face to face dealings with 
peasants, are able to offer this service.26 Secondly, local patrons have significant information about 
local needs, which is useful when politicians engage in non-programmatic distribution.27 Thirdly, 
contracting with local patrons is ‘cheaper’ than expending public resources towards the masses, as 
the number of people that the politician needs to satisfy shrinks from a winning majority of 
constituents to a winning majority of brokers.28 Finally, securing votes through local patrons is 
more likely to yield electoral results than campaigning, as defection on the part of the landlord is 
often detectable due to the large number of votes he controls.29  
In short, the politician-broker-peasant network is beneficial for both politicians, who get 
access to a guaranteed vote base, and local patrons, who gain control over state resources. While 
                                               
26 Keefer and Vlaicu 2008 
27 Stokes et al 2013. 
28 Mason and Joshi 2008. The terms of the exchange between politicians and local patrons are determined 
through a bargaining game. The strength of each party depends on factors such as the number of votes the 
patron is offering, the politicians’ standing in the upcoming election and the relative social and economic 
status of the two. This bargaining game has been studied extensively, but is outside the scope of this paper. 
See footnote 1 for references. 
29 Fox 1994; Powell 1970; Scott1972. This is contrasted by contracting with citizens who, by virtue of 
constituting a minute fraction of the voting body, have a higher chance of reneging (mostly by choosing not 
to vote) without detection by the politician (Keefer 2004). 
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this has implications for many aspects of the democratic process, the core insight relevant to this 
paper is simply that public resources are placed at the disposal of local patrons. How these 
resources are then spent is at the discretion of these unelected patrons, who not only decide what 
goods and services are to be provided but also who benefits from public provision. 30 The end result 
is that poor constituents lose out from the triadic clientelist network, as they lack the bargaining 
power to negotiate better terms for themselves.31  
 
 
The Impact of Connectivity  
Basu argues that landlords enjoy exploitative powers when inequality is accompanied with 
peasants having limited outside options for satisfying their needs.32 In isolated villages, landlords 
have strict control over a multiplicity of services (see above). This results in markets getting 
interlinked, where disagreement with the patron in any single market (e.g. political) has 
consequences for other markets (e.g. credit, housing, employment).33 It is thus the interaction of 
inequality with isolation that enables patrons in isolated villages to use sticks – from employment 
termination, eviction, refusal of credit to social ostracizing – rather than carrots to influence clients’ 
behaviour.34 
                                               
30 Gazdar 2000. 
31 Keefer 2007; Mason and Joshi 2008.  
32 Basu 1986 
33 See for example Bardhan 1980; Basu 1986; Bhaduri 1977. Markets are interlinked when equilibria in 
multiple markets are jointly determined. Economics literature shows how a monopolistic landlord, due to the 
multiplicity of services he has to offer, is able to interlink markets so that equilibrium in a single market is 
tied to equilibria in most, or all, other markets. This makes disagreement with the landlord in any market 
very costly, as it results in negative spillovers to other markets. See also Author 2012a.   
34 Author 2012a; Dasgupta 1993; Mason 1986. 
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Using road networks to connect villages to the broader market should change this bargaining 
relationship by creating exit options for peasants.35 One such option is through new employment 
possibilities.36 These are important even if the client continues to work for the patron. For, although 
connectivity does not necessarily result in a major shift in the rural employment market, the 
underlying nature of the relationship is significantly altered as exit options takes away patrons’ 
ability to use the threat of employment sanctions as a means of controlling clients.37  
Secondly, increased accessibility can attract an influx of new actors wanting to take 
advantage of the opportunities in these villages. This includes new resource-rich individuals who 
are willing and able to provide peasants with an alternative to their current patron in one or more 
markets. Rouse, while looking at the effects of capitalism in rural Pakistan, finds that new market 
opportunities created new elites in the rural economy, some of whom challenged the authority of the 
local landlord by offering support to peasants who defied the landlord.38 Equally, opening up a 
village may provide peasants with up new credit possibilities, insurance possibilities, dispute 
resolution options, and so forth that previously were under the monopoly of the landlord. 
Whereas patrons in isolated villages can ensure that clients are excluded from public funds 
provided by the government without losing their support,39 market access should increase the 
bargaining power of clients. This in turn allows them to demand more public services to be 
                                               
35 Scott (1972) observed how unused land in rural Philippines limited the power of landlords as it provided 
peasants with alternative options.  
36 While the benefits of connectivity are dependent on the opportunities available in the external market, it 
can be argued that they would always be better than those found in an isolated village dominated by a large 
landlord (Platteau 1995).  
37 Wingrod and Morin 1971. See also Author 2012a. 
38 Rouse1988. 
39 Cheema and Mohmand (2005) found that villagers in rural Punjab, Pakistan, who supported the incumbent, 
but were not part of a patronage network, were less likely to enjoy public provision, as the incumbent mayor 
channelled funds towards local landlords.  
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brokered by their patron.40 While these benefits would extend to all clients, they would be felt most 
strongly by vulnerable households as they are most likely to exit from the clientelist network 
whenever the opportunity presents itself. Therefore, the patron would have a strong incentive to 
divert resources towards these vulnerable households so as to retain their clientelist support. 
This then results in two testable hypotheses regarding the effects of connectivity on the 
politics of rural economies:  
1. By providing peasants with exit options, connectivity should reduce peasants’ dependence on 
the local patron and therefore enable them to demand increased public provision in exchange 
for their votes. This effect should be felt most strongly in highly unequal villages where a 
dominant patron is found. 
2. Within the village the benefits of connectivity should be felt most strongly by peasants who are 
most vulnerable to exploitation when isolated. 
Before continuing, it is worth highlighting that exit options are not the only way in which 
connectivity could increase the bargaining power of the rural poor. For instance, Bailey (1957) 
found that the opening up of a small Indian village led to the emergence of new patrons altogether, 
who offered fierce competition to existing patrons for peasants’ support. Yet, this development took 
decades, whereas the data used in the analysis below was collected shortly after the introduction of 
the road networks. Therefore, the introduction of new patrons is not the focus of this study.  
Another important effect of connectivity could be through raising awareness amongst 
peasants regarding their political rights and possibilities, which may result in greater demands for 
                                               
40 The local patron has limited ability to either capture new opportunities from connectivity or bar villagers 
from participating in them, as it would entail erecting a barrier on the road network so as to restrict traffic 
(and external traders) from coming to the village. The costs of doing this would often be extremely high. 
Alternatively, the patron could make use of violence to bar clients from participating in the newly available 
market opportunities. But besides having legal implications, this too is a costly option as it leads to a loss of 




public provision in exchange for their votes.41 While this is an important mechanism, the nature of 
information flows makes it difficult to establish causation. Therefore, awareness, rather than being 
the focus of the analysis below, is included as a control.  
  
2. Empirical Analysis 
 
The case of Pakistan 
Rural Pakistan is a good case to test the above framework for a number of interconnected 
reasons. Firstly, it has in place extensive clientelist networks infiltrating almost every aspect of 
villagers’ lives.42 Secondly, the country suffers from low levels of accountability and weak 
institutional structures, thus making it possible for politicians to appropriate public funds without 
having to face severe consequences.43 As Gazdar notes, public resources in Pakistan are often used 
“as a currency for the disbursement of patronage”.44 Even local club goods, such as drains and 
paved streets, are often targeted towards individual households aligned with the local patron.45 
Neighbouring households, not aligned with the patron, are routinely excluded from such goods.46  
Although, such blatant targeting is highly inefficient, it allows us to analyse the effect of changing 
bargaining power on public provision within villages.  
                                               
41 Prat and Strömberg 2006. 
42 Ahmad 1977; Gazdar 2000; Rouse 1988. 
43 Keefer 2004. 
44 Gazdar 2000, 77.   
45 Cheema and Mohmand 2008, 2005. 
46 This is something I also observe in my data with regards to drains and paved streets. It appears that what 




Third, in 2001 the military government, in an effort to legitimise its rule, instituted local 
government reforms that devolved public funds and their spending decisions to the local level.47 
This influx of public funds provided a good opportunity to analyse how resources are distributed in 
villages with varying levels of bargaining powers between brokers and their clients.  
Finally, but crucially, Pakistan offers a natural experiment to study the role of connectivity. 
In 1998, the federal government constructed a motorway connecting two major cities; Lahore and 
Islamabad. Along the 365 km of this road there are multiple exits, each of which has a link road 
connecting the motorway to the nearest city/town. These link roads run past villages that were 
previously connected by dirt trails which restricted traffic and peasant mobility. Through its 
extensive network of link roads, the motorway has resulted in an increase in traffic and outsiders 
coming to these villages. While mobility allows peasants to explore employment options outside the 
village economy, increased traffic has also led to the creation of new jobs within the village in the 
form of roadside cafes, vehicle repair shops, general stores, etc. 
The decision regarding the placement of the motorway was made by the federal government 
based on three main considerations – geography, connectivity and defence.48 Efforts were made to 
minimize the stretch that ran through geographical hazards, while still ensuring that the route was 
not very close to the old highway and passed through as many towns and villages as possible. Also, 
the road had to avoid a military bombing range which was situated between Lahore and Islamabad 
thus making certain routes unfeasible. Even though none of these factors were systematically 
related to specific village characteristics, there were rumours that the placement of the motorway 
was altered in order to connect the lands of large landlords. While I was unable to find evidence to 
confirm this, I identified areas where the motorway was not altered from the original plan. Among 
                                               
47 See Faguet and Shami (2015) for details regarding Pakistan’s local government system. 
48 Republic Engineering Corporation Limited 1988. 
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these was Hafizabad district.49 Looking through newspaper archives from around 1998 I found that, 
while there were allegations raised against large landlords from various parts of the country trying 
to influence the placement of the road, none of them pertained to landlords from Hafizabad. This is 
not surprising when we consider that landlords in this district, while commanding considerable 
authority in their own villages, would be considered part of the lower middle class in urban settings. 
This was quite evident from the houses they lived in, the cars they drove, the schools they sent their 
children to and their own levels of education. Hence, they lacked the clout needed to influence the 
federal government’s decision.50 Moreover, Hafizabad’s political representative in government 
around 1998 belonged to the opposition – a party that had strongly opposed the construction of the 
motorway51 – and therefore was unlikely to be able to negotiate any changes in its route or its link 
roads. As a result, the motorway was an exogenous shock to Hafizabad’s village economies. 
 
Methodology 
The empirical study makes use of data collected from villages located at varying proximity 
to the motorway52 in Hafizabad district.53 Villages are within the same unit of local government, 
face the same government budget and, as they are in the same district, are represented by the same 
Mayor. This allows me to control for the effect of Pakistan’s local government reforms: if 
                                               
49 This was also verified through a personal interview with Chaudary Altaf, who had been the Director 
General of the National Highways Authority.  
50 GKH 2005. 
51 The idea of the motorway was first proposed in the late 1980s by the Muslim League (ML) government. 
However, construction was  delayed because the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) came into power which was 
strongly opposed to the project. 
52 Proximity to the road refers to distance from the link roads. 
53 For other studies using this survey, see author (2012a) and author (2012b). 
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improvements were due to decentralization, then we should see relatively equal levels of provision 
across the villages, irrespective of levels of inequality or isolation.54  
Within the district, eight villages were chosen with four having the motorway link road run 
through them and four being situated at a distance of eight to eleven kilometres from these link-
roads. Bad infrastructure has meant that travelling to distant villages took between 40 and 90 
minutes by car from the motorway exit. Moreover, interviews with households revealed that, for 
most peasants, the biggest hurdle to travelling was the limited availability of transport facilities. 
Often villagers had to wait up to an hour to get a ride to the nearby town or city and, once there, 
found it difficult to find a ride back. Therefore, unless households had their own transport they 
tended to avoid going into the nearby town or city.55 Villagers situated close to the motorway, on 
the other hand, are now very mobile as there has been a substantial increase in the number of 
transport facilities available to them. Most households now have to wait less than ten minutes to get 
a ride, thus enabling them to travel to nearby towns and cities to look for work outside of the 
agricultural sector – a sector that is controlled mostly by the landlord.56 Moreover, the increase in 
traffic has meant that households can generate an additional income by providing goods and 
services to passers-by. My surveyors and I experienced this first-hand as we were often approached, 
by someone or the other, trying to sell us goods ranging from food to toys to little crowns made out 
of flowers. By contrast, in isolated villages the only people approaching us were little children who 
were curious about the outsiders in their village.   
                                               
54 The benefits of decentralisation are disputed in the literature. Some scholars argue that bringing the 
politician closer to the population allows citizens to demand provision, whereas others argue that 
decentralization leads to an increase in elite capture at the grass-roots level. For an overview, see Faguet 
2012. 
55 Key respondent 2. 
56 This is evident from the fact that 51% of households in connected villages felt that there had been an 
increase in employment opportunities outside the agricultural sector, while only 37% of households felt the 
same in isolated villages (p<0.01; see discussion of survey data below).  
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The data used in this paper comes from a household-level survey conducted in 2008. While 
it would have been optimal to compare provision levels pre- and post-connectivity, such data does 
not exist as data collection in the region has been fairly limited. This paper overcomes this 
disadvantage through its research design which compares outcomes in villages dominated by large 
landlords (landlord-dominated villages) to villages with relatively egalitarian distribution of land 
(peasant-based villages).57 Following Banerjee and Iyers’ study of West Bengal, the expectation is 
that ‘monopolist’ (or monopsonist; see below) patrons in landlord-dominated villages appropriate 
public resources without jeopardising their clients’ political support, whereas the competition 
among patrons in peasant-based villages forces them to channel more public funds towards their 
clients.58 In other words, peasant-based villages are used as a control group against which outcomes 
in connected and isolated landlord-dominated villages are compared. In addition, the paper relies on 
households’ recall of provision levels prior to the construction of the motorway, which was verified 
through key respondent interviews.59  
The village selection process involved identifying land holding patterns across the district. A 
village was classified as being landlord-dominated if any single household’s landholding was 100 
acres or greater60 and there were a maximum of three households in the village with such large 
landholdings. The latter criterion was based on Platteau’s (1995) finding that landlords in South 
Asia often abide by time honoured traditions of not accepting other landlords’ run-away peasants. 
This enables patrons to act as monopolists/monopsonists even when they co-exist with one or two 
other large landlords in the village. Villages were also split based on their level of isolation, thereby 
                                               
57 Land distribution is exogenous to this model as it was historically determined by the British revenue 
collecting machinery (For more details see Nelson 2011). 
58 Banerjee and Iyer 2005.  
59 The motorway was a major shock to villages in the area and as a result households measured time from 
before and after the road. This makes recollection fairly reliable.  
60This was the ceiling placed at the last land reforms carried out in Pakistan (Rashid 1985).  
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creating 4 groups of villages; isolated landlord- and peasant-based villages and connected landlord- 




                                Landlord-dominated          Peasant-based 
Close to the Motorway                   2          2  
 
Far from the Motorway       2          2 
 
 In my sample, the land holdings of patrons in landlord-dominated villages vary from 100 to 
300 acres. In peasant-based villages, on the other hand, the average landholding of patrons is only 
23 acres. Incidence of landlessness amongst peasants is as high in peasant-based villages as in 
landlord-dominated villages. This similarity means that we expect the structure of clientelist 
networks to be relatively similar in peasant- and landlord-dominated villages.61 The difference, 
however, lies in the power that patrons enjoy within their respective clientelist networks. While the 
multiplicity of patrons means that no single landowner is powerful enough to wield control in 
peasant-based villages, the main landowner in landlord-dominated villages is large enough to be, 
for most peasants; the main source of employment, the owner of their homestead land and, most of 
the time, the main source of credit. This allows him to enjoy considerable control, which can be 
used to make high demands off the peasants. 
Apart from these differences, the eight villages are relatively very similar. From Table 1 we 
find that while close to 70% of households derive their primary source of income from agriculture, 
around 54% of households are landless. Therefore, a substantial portion of households working in 
the fields are dependent on local landlords for their livelihood. 
                                               





Households’ average monthly spending was $100 which sustains around 8 people living in a 
3 room house, enabling around 76% of households to consume three meals a day. Furthermore, we 
can see that in all types of villages the state provides population welfare centres and police stations 
within a 10km radius. However, around 60% of households choose to approach their patron for 
dispute resolution and claim to have always done so. However, through interviews, it  became clear 
that most households’ hesitation to use public institutions is not due to their distance, but rather due 
to their having little faith in government institutions. The only time they visit these institutions is 
when their patron accompanies them as his presence ensures that they will not be ignored.    
  The relative similarity between the villages enables us to make the counterfactual that, prior 
to the construction of the road, provision levels in these villages would not vary based on 
geography. This allows us to use the spatial variable (distance) as a proxy for time (before and after) 
with respect to the road. Combined with households’ recall of provision levels prior to the 
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construction of the motorway, this should give us a good indication of the effect connectivity has 
had on households’ chances of receiving public resources.  
Within the eight villages, household-level surveys were collected from a stratified random 
sample of 20% of households. Stratification was done along biradery lines, as literature on South 
Asia documents this as being a good proxy for social status and is found to influence their 
relationship with the patron and thus the public resources that they enjoy.62 Within the selected 
villages, the upper class biraderies were the Kharrals and the Bhattis. These were historically the 
land owning classes, which gave them their elevated status. Interestingly, a Kharral or a Bhatti 
household is considered part of the upper class even if it is landless. Amongst the lower class 
particular emphasis was placed on Muslim Sheikhs and the Ansaris. These biraderies were 
historically not allowed to own land. Even though there is no legal restriction against them owning 
land today, almost all households of these biraderies were still landless in the villages. Muslim 
Sheikhs have the lower status among the two, as they are responsible for performing menial tasks 
which others consider demeaning (such as cleaning village drains).  
The analysis is restricted to two publicly provided goods; drains and paved streets. The 
reason lies in the nature of these goods and the way in which they are provided in rural Pakistan. As 
mentioned earlier, drains and paved streets in rural Pakistan tend to be excludable goods. This holds 
true even within a neighbourhood, where one would intuitively expect such goods to be non-
excludable in order to be effective. Moreover, these goods tend to be provided through a local 
patron, who is responsible for deciding on their quantity, quality and placement. 
The two goods are also useful to analyse jointly due to their impact on mobility. In the 
absence of a drain, households’ waste flows directly onto the street outside their main doors. This, 
besides spreading diseases, makes it difficult for people to move around, particularly if the street is 
                                               
62 Ahmad 1977; Alavi 1972. 
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not paved.63 Perhaps as a result, households in my survey were indifferent between getting drains or 
paved streets (although they would of course prefer both).   
In order to test the effects of connectivity the following logistic regression models are run: 
Yiv = α + β1MWv + β2LLv + β3Landiv+β4Bhiv+ β5`Khiv +β6Aniv + β7MSiv+ ξ iv   (1) 
Yiv = α + β1MWv + β2LLv + β3MWv*LLv+ β4Landiv +β5Bhiv+ β6Khiv +β7Aniv + β8MSiv + ξ iv (2) 
Yiv is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if household i in village v has received state 
provision, 0 otherwise. Distance from the road, MWv, takes the value of 1 if the household resides 
in an isolated village, and 0 otherwise. Distance is a binary rather than continuous variable as the 
research design looks at villages which were polar opposite, i.e. while half have the motorway link 
road running through the village, the other half are far enough to be classified as being isolated. 
Within this setup modest changes in distance are irrelevant in practise. Distance is used as a proxy 
for exit options as it helps capture both realised opportunities and potential ones. These can then be 
used by the client as a credible threat to negotiate better terms. LLv is 1 if the household resides in a 
village dominated by a large landlord, and 0 if it is in a peasant-based village. Landiv is a continuous 
variable, measured in acres, capturing the amount of land owned by peasant households. This 
variable is included because land owning households have higher bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
landlord as they are less dependent on him than landless households.64 The last four variables are 
dummies for the major biraderies found in the villages which are included as a control for the social 
status of the household. Bhiv and Khiv take the value of 1 if the household belongs to the Bhatti or 
Kharral biradery respectively. Aniv is 1 if the household is an Ansari and MSiv is 1 if the 
household’s biradery is Muslim Sheikh. The variable MWv*LLv in Equation 2 is an interaction term 
which captures the effect of belonging to a landlord-dominated village far from the road. 
Connectivity is also expected to have spillover effects on a household’s level of awareness. 
It could be argued then that the impact of the motorway on public provision levels is not through an 
                                               
63 I would like to thank Hadia Majid for bringing this point to my attention. 
64 Scott 1972. 
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increase in peasants’ bargaining power – the focus of this paper - but rather due to an increase in 
levels of awareness. Hence it is possible that Equations 1 and 2 suffer from an omitted variable bias 
and are over-estimating the effect of the road through exit options. Therefore, as robustness checks 
the basic model is adjusted to include controls for levels of awareness:  
Yiv = α + β1MWv + β2LLv + β3MWv*LLv + β4Landiv + β5Niv + β6Hiv + β7Bhiv+ β8Khiv +β9Aniv + 
β10MSiv + ξiv      (3) 
Awareness is measured through two proxies; whether the household has access to a 
newspaper65 (Niv) and whether the household has heard about local government participatory bodies 
(Hiv).66 The local government ordinance in Pakistan has made provision for four participatory 
bodies that are meant to facilitate participatory development and increase political accountability. 
However, their functionality has been limited, ironically due to citizens being unaware of their 
existence.67 While connectivity would have an impact on these variables, as mentioned above, the 
nature of information flow makes it very difficult to determine the cause of the increase. 
Lastly, following from hypothesis 2, the paper investigates the effect of connectivity on 
vulnerable households. Household vulnerability is measured through two variables; households’ 
social status and the extent of their interaction with the landlord. As mentioned before, multiple 
dealings with the landlord can result in transactions being interlinked so that equilibria for a bundle 
of transactions are jointly determined. Aside from the efficiency implications, such transactions tend 
to have severe welfare implications for economically and socially poor households, as a 
disagreement in one market has consequences for all other dealings with the landlord. Therefore, 
                                               
65 Access simply means they are able to get information irrespective of whether they subscribe to a 
newspaper  themselves, are reading it at a nearby shop or friend’s house, or are having a friend relay 
information to them. 
66 The correlation between connectivity and having heard about participatory bodies is -0.07 while the 
correlation between connectivity and access to a newspaper is 0.03.  
67 Kurosaki 2007. 
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households in an interlinked relationship should be less inclined to withdraw their political support 
from a landlord who does not broker public resources for them. This is tested with the following 
specification: 
Yiv = α + β1MWv + β2 LLv + β3MWv *LLv + β4Interiv + β5MWv*Interiv+ β6Landiv +β7Bhiv+ β8Khiv 
+β9Aniv + β10MSiv + ξ iv    (4) 
Interiv takes the value of 1 if the household has multiple dealings with the landlord. For 
instance, a household is said to be in an interlinked relationship if its members work for the landlord 
and approach him for credit and dispute resolution. MWv *Interiv tests the effect of isolation on 





Figure 1 looks at provision levels pre-motorway, based on household recall. As can be seen, 
provision levels are fairly similar irrespective of the village’s location. The small difference is not 
statistically significant.68 This means that in the absence of purely political considerations (like links 
with local patrons), politicians have no inherent reason to target some villages over others as no-one 
was relatively disadvantaged. 
                                               
68 Significance is calculated using the Chi-square test. 
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Figure 1: Public Provision Pre-Motorway 
 
This similarity holds even after controlling for household and village characteristics. Table 2 
runs a logistic regression model in order to establish that the road is in fact an exogenous shock with 
respect to public provision. As can be seen, the variable for connectivity is insignificant. This, 
therefore, allows us to rule out the possibility that there are systematic differences in terms of public 
provision based on the location of the villages. Interestingly, the variable for land tenure systems is 
also insignificant. Figure 1 above highlights how provision levels are very similar in both landlord-
dominated and peasant-based villages. This is contrary to our expectation, as theory would predict 
provision levels to be higher in peasant-based villages than in landlord-dominated ones. One 
possible explanation could lie in the undefined age of the good provided by the government. While 
households could recall whether the drain or street was provided before or after the motorway, they 
were typically unable to recall how old it was. This means that provision pre-motorway could be 
anywhere between 10 to 30 to even 40 years old. Therefore, cumulatively provision levels between 
the two villages seem to have converged.   
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Table 2: Does the household benefit from state provision? 
 
However, this does not mean that villagers on the whole are unaffected by land tenure 
systems. Figure 2 goes on to analyse how total spending is divided between the different social 
classes in these villages. We find that while the majority of public funds are directed towards the 
upper class in landlord-dominated villages (the difference is significant at the 1% level), in peasant-
based villages the distribution is more equal between the social classes. Table A1, illustrates that 
these differences hold even after controlling for geography and awareness levels. This is in line with 
the expectation that upper class households have stronger bargaining power vis-à-vis the landlord, 
even in landlord-dominated villages, and therefore are able to secure public provision for 
themselves. The lower classes, who are extremely vulnerable and thus suffer from weak bargaining 
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power, receive only 17% of the total goods provided to these villages. Such discrimination is not 
evident in peasant-based villages.69       
Figure 2:Distribution of Public Resources Between Social Classes Pre-Motorway  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the total level of public provision across the different types of villages at 
the time of the survey.70 As a start, we can see that households situated in isolated landlord-
dominated villages have the lowest levels of public provision when compared to all other types of 
villages. However, this disadvantage is clearly not due to isolation as households residing in equally 
isolated peasant-based villages enjoyed significantly higher levels of state provision. This difference 
is significant at the 1% level. Multiplicity of patrons in peasant-based villages has meant that, even 
when isolated, no single patron is strong enough to demand his clients’ political support without 
securing public resources for them.  
                                               
69 The small difference between the two is not statistically significant. 
70 This is both after the construction of the motorway and local government reforms, which transferred funds 
to the local level.  
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Figure 3: Public Provision  
 
Turning to landlord-dominated villages we find that public provision is substantially higher 
in connected landlord-dominated villages when compared to isolated ones. This difference is 
significant at the 10% level. In fact, the figure reveals that provision levels in landlord-dominated 
villages, close to the road, are converging towards those found in peasant-based villages. This lends 
support to the argument that inequality by itself too is not sufficient to afford landlords 
monopolistic control over their clients. When comparing connected and isolated peasant-based 
villages, the difference in provision levels is insignificant.71  
Before continuing, it is worth commenting on the curious finding that provision levels are 
highest in isolated peasant-based villages. This can be explained by the fact that patrons in these 
villages spend more on drains, which are cheaper to provide, than on paving streets which are more 
expensive (see figure 1A in the appendix). In peasant-based villages close to the road, public 
resources were split between the cheaper drains and (more expensive) paved streets. This resulted in 
slightly fewer households benefiting from state provision (the small difference is statistically 
insignificant). Since households expressed an equal preference between drains and paved streets, 
                                               
71 High provision levels in isolated peasant-based villages rule out the possibility that politicians were 
targeting visible villages to demonstrate their responsiveness to their wider constituency. See Shami and 
Majid (2014) for a discussion on the impact of visibility on politicians’ spending decisions.  
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service providers used their discretion in deciding how funds were spent between these two types of 
goods. Therefore, the difference observed was merely a reflection of the choices brokers made. 
The findings above resonate with the information that peasants and landlords provided 
during qualitative interviews. Talking to one landlord in a connected village it was clear that, in the 
absence of economic sanctions he lacked the ability to coerce peasants’ political decisions and 
therefore, had to provide positive incentives instead. This was evident from his description of the 
effect of the motorway: 
 
“Things are very different since the construction of the motorway. Previously all I had to do 
was express a need and peasants used to come running to help. Now it is different. Now the 
peasants prefer to pursue the new alternatives made available by the motorway. As a result, I 
can no longer expect them to do whatever I say, rather I have to give them something in 
return.”72 
 
Peasants too seemed mindful of this change; “Now (after the construction of the motorway) 
he has to tend to our needs as he needs us to work in his fields”73, was the response of one 
household regarding why their landlord channelled public funds to them. Most households were not 
only aware, but were also fairly vocal, about the fact that connectivity had increased exit options 
which they could exercise if the exchange with the landlord was not beneficial. And since markets 
in these villages were interlinked, the calculation regarding whether the exchange with the landlord 
was beneficial took political provision into account. Therefore, in order to retain his labourers, the 
landlord now had to take their political needs into account. However, this is not to say that these 
                                               
72Landlord 1. This change was felt so acutely by the landlord that not only was he found to broker public 
funds, he also encouraged peasants to collectively self provide for goods. He did this by providing financial 
and moral support for such activities.  See Author 2012b for details. 
73 Household ID 266. 
27 
 
landlords don’t also have political motives for brokering public funds. When probed as to why there 
had been an increase in public provision in the village over the last few years, one  large landlord 
from a connected village responded: “During elections they are more likely to align with me 
politically if I help provide them with the goods and services they need.”74 
Households too were aware of their newfound political power as, in response to the same 
question, one household replied: “He helps us because he wants our political support”75. This 
sentiment was expressed by many in connected villages, particularly by younger members of the 
households. Such political assuredness was in stark contrast to the attitude of villagers in isolated 
landlord-dominated villages. The autarkic nature of the economy meant that the large landlord had a 
strong hold on most economic opportunities in the village economy and could bar non-complying 
households from access to these resources. Peasant households, on their part, had no doubt that he 
would cut them off for disobeying him. As one household told me: “where would we go if we defied 
him?”76 Another stated: “How would we feed our children if he cuts us off?” 77 While drains and 
paved streets were certainly important to these households, they were a small price to pay to have 
access to resources that helped maintain their subsistence.78 
Being aware of this, the patrons from isolated landlord-dominated villages had no qualms 
about diverting public funds towards their own neighbourhoods. As a result, the area around their 
houses had well paved streets and functioning drains, while most of the village sat in disrepair. The 
patrons from the connected villages enjoyed no such luxury. As one of them pointed out: “Look 
                                               
74Landlord 1, cited in Author (2012b). 
75 Household ID 258.  
76Household ID 45, cited in Author (2012a).  
77Household ID 286, cited in Author (2012a). 
78 In these villages households questioned whether voting independently would result in politicians being 




outside my house, my own street is unpaved. I dare not fix it as otherwise peasants will come and 
shout at me for not fixing their streets also.”79 
So while peasants in connected villages seemed to be putting considerable stock into their 
patron’s ability to secure funds for them and thus based their voting decision on it, those in isolated 
landlord-dominated villages clearly did not, as blatant elite capture in their villages had limited 
impact on their decision to align politically with their patron.  
The tables that follow run logistic regressions to test whether the findings above hold after 
controlling for village and household level characteristics. The analysis is carried out in three steps. 
Table 3 starts by looking at the aggregate data. It focuses mainly on connectivity and land tenure 
systems while controlling for household level characteristics. Step 2 looks at who within the village 
is benefitting from connectivity by disaggregating the data (see Table 4). This is done on the 
expectation that large variation in household level variables in the different villages would cause 
their impact to be averaged out in the aggregate data. Lastly, Table 5 takes a closer look at 
vulnerable households – measured through the presence of interlinked relationships – using both 
aggregate data and a sample restricted to landlord-dominated villages.    
Starting with the basic model, Table 3 shows, similar to Banerjee’s and Iyer’s argument, that 
land tenure system matters for public provision.80 Those situated in landlord-dominated villages are 
13% less likely to enjoy state provision when compared to households in peasant-based villages. 
However, the introduction of the interaction term in Column 2 reveals that this disadvantage holds 
only when villages are isolated from the external economy. In line with hypothesis 1, peasants 
residing in isolated landlord-dominated villages are 18%  (see Table 3.a.)81 less likely to have state 
provision directed towards them when compared to households in connected peasant-based villages. 
                                               
79 Landlord 1. 
80 Banerjee and Iyer 2005. 
81 The full effect of the interaction term cannot be read straight from the table. It is calculated by adding 
together the interaction term and the coefficient of the two variables when not interacted. 
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Column 3 runs the extended model to check whether the effect of connectivity holds after 
controlling for levels of awareness. As can be seen the interaction term continues to be significant.  
Table 3.a displays partial effects which allows us to look at the effect of connectivity 
separately on landlord-dominated and peasant-based villages and the effect of inequality separately 
on isolated and connected villages. Starting with the effects of connectivity, the first row illustrates 
the benefits accrued to landlord-dominated villages. We find that households residing in isolated 
landlord-dominated villages are 17% less likely to enjoy public provision when compared to those 
in connected landlord-dominated villages. Peasant-based villages, however, don’t seem to be 
affected by connectivity as the second row shows the effect of the road to be insignificant. Turning 
next to the effect of inequality, from Column 2 we can see that households residing in isolated 
landlord-dominated villages are 24% less likely to enjoy state provision when compared to those 
living in just as isolated peasant-based villages. Connectivity seems to eradicate this disadvantage 
as the difference in outcomes amongst the two types of villages is insignificant (see Column 1).  
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Table 3: Does the household benefit from state provision? 
 




Another interesting finding in Table 3 is the lack of significance of the landholding variable. 
While prior to the construction of the motorway provision was directed towards landed households 
(see Table 2), post-motorway they don’t seem to enjoy any significant advantage. This lends 
support to hypothesis 2 that the benefits of connectivity are extending to the poorer members of the 
village economy. In order to explore this further and get a better understanding of who within the 
village is benefiting from connectivity, Table 4 splits the data by distance and levels of inequality.  
 
Who benefits from connectivity? 
To start with, table 4 reaffirms the findings above. Connectivity has a beneficial impact on 
landlord-dominated villages (see columns 1 and 2) while multiplicity of patrons has a beneficial 
impact on isolated villages (see columns 3 and 4).  
Turning to household level variables, we find that land ownership continues to matter for 
provision in isolated villages but has no significant impact in connected ones. This lends support to 
the argument that, increase in outside options has a similar effect on a household’s chances of 
benefitting from state resources as land ownership i.e. it provides them with alternative options for 
earning a livelihood which, in turn, reduces their dependence on the patron. As a result, villagers 
should be in a stronger position to demand public provision in return for their votes.  
Looking at the effect of social class, we can see that while Muslim Sheikh households living 
in remote villages have a 21% lower chance of receiving publicly provided goods than the middle 
class, in isolated village none of the Ansari households have received any provision through the 
state. Once connected to the external economy though, both Ansaris and Muslim Sheiks face no 
significant disadvantage. The advantage to the socially lower classes seems to be at the expense of 
the upper classes, as Bhatti households in connected villages are 20% less likely to benefit from 
state provision. From Column 1 we can see that the disadvantage to Bhatti households is mainly in 
landlord-dominated villages. A curious finding is that Kharral households, who also belong to the 
upper class, have a 14% lower chance of receiving public resources when isolated. However, 
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looking at the results in Column 2 it can be seen that this is driven by outcomes in peasant-based 
villages.  
Table 4: Does the household benefit from state provision? 
 
Overall Table 4 presents strong evidence in support of hypothesis 2; Connectivity seems to 
be reducing the disadvantage that poor and socially disadvantaged households felt when isolated 
from the external market. Table 5 goes a step further, by including a measure for household 
vulnerability (the presence of interlinked relationships), to gauge whether the benefits of 
connectivity extend to the truly vulnerable households.  
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 Table 5: Does the household benefit from state provision? 
 
Table 5.a. Partial effects of connectivity and interlinked relationships on public provision 




Column 1 starts by looking at the aggregate data. Being in an interlinked relationship is found to 
have an insignificant impact on the households’ chances of receiving public provision. Once again 
this may be due to the results being averaged out in the aggregate data.82 Column 2, therefore, looks 
at data restricted to landlord-dominated villages only. I find that being in an interlinked relationship 
in an isolated landlord-dominated village reduces the households’ chances of benefitting from 
public resources by 18%.83 Moreover, looking at partial effects in Table 5.a. we can see from 
Column 2 that in isolated villages, households engaged in an interlinked relationship, are 6% less 
likely to enjoy public provision when compared to those having single dealings with the landlord 
(significant at the 1% level). Interestingly, from Table 5 we can see that, within connected landlord-
dominated villages, households engaged in an interlinked relationship are 8% more likely to benefit 
from state provision (significant at the 5% level).84 This is in line with hypothesis 2 as these are 
households who were most exploited when isolated. Therefore, they are most likely to exercise their 
exit options and thus need strong incentives to continue engaging with the landlord. Hence while 
landlords ignore households over whom they significant control in their contract with the politician, 
once connected landlords wanting to maintain their interaction with peasants are forced to channel 
public funds towards their clients.   
 
4. Conclusion 
Literature on rural development documents the importance of public provision in reducing 
inequality. While efforts have been made by governments to improve provision and combat 
                                               
82 Looking at interlinkages in rural Punjab, Author (2012a) finds this structure to be particularly exploitative 
in isolated landlord-dominated villages as peasants here lack outside options. 
83 The full effect of the interaction term is -0.12+0.08-0.14. 
84 The inclusion of the interaction term in a logistic regression means that the variable for interlinkages 
captures the effect of the relationship in connected villages. This is because it assumes that the variable for 
distance is 0.  
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corruption, elite-capture and patronage politics have often stood in the way of the desired results. 
This paper focused on the political aspects of the “lopsided friendship”85 between landlords and 
peasants and the consequent outcomes in terms of public provision in the rural economy. It showed 
that the presence of clientelism erodes politicians’ incentive to provide for their constituents 
directly, as they are able to guarantee success by contracting with local patrons. As a result, public 
provision to peasants is largely dependent on their bargaining power vis-à-vis their patron. Yet, 
large scale inequality, combined with isolation, has meant that patrons often enjoy considerably 
higher bargaining power and are therefore able to direct most public funds towards themselves.  
Connecting isolated villages to the wider national economy through road networks was 
found to be one way of increasing the bargaining power of peasants. The link-roads connected to 
the motorway have led to a significant increase in traffic passing through villages, thereby 
increasing peasants’ mobility and employment opportunities. While most households did not 
choose to seek employment outside the village, these new options made peasants feel less 
dependent on the patron and thus enabled them to question why their votes were not translating into 
increased public provision. 
Ten years after the construction of the motorway I find it to have strong spill-over effects on 
social dynamics within the villages. The breakdown of patrons’ monopoly/monopsony power has 
led to an increase in the bargaining power of peasants, which they are now able to use for making 
demands on their patron. This can be seen through the higher levels of provision enjoyed by 
villagers close to the motorway. These benefits are being felt most strongly by the landless and 
socially lower classes who are most vulnerable in village society. Thus the evidence lends support 
to the claim that connectivity has altered the nature of the clientelist relationship, from one which 
was based on exploitation to one that is more cooperative in nature.  
Even though the analysis is based on rural communities operating within (weak) democratic 
institutions, the results may also be applicable  to urban communities and non-democratic regimes. 
                                               
85 Pitt-Rivers 1954, 140.  
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While the urban poor are never as isolated as their rural counterparts, they too need to align with 
local brokers who may take advantage of their clients’ poverty.86 Moreover, in non-democratic 
regimes, clientelist exchanges would entail brokers offering support for the regime and suppression 
of revolts or uprisings in exchange for public resources.87 Therefore, while it would have to be 
subject to further study, the results of this paper may provide foundational insights on political 
clientelism in a wide range of contexts. 
Even without applying this to urban and autocratic contexts, the policy implication drawn 
from this study is clear: when politics is dominated by clientelism, "exit has an essential role to play 
in restoring quality performance of government…".88 More specifically, it is imperative to connect 
rural villages to the outside economy so as to break their isolation and thus reduce the exploitative 
powers of resource rich patrons. Road networks are one way of achieving this. Aside from 
providing rural economies with much needed infrastructural development, such policies are not 
politically contentious, thereby making them easier to implement. This is not to say that building 
roads provides a silver bullet. However, what the road has done is to provide the stimuli needed to 
change power dynamics within rural villages which, in turn, enables villagers to start demanding 
their political rights. It can, therefore, be considered as a first step on the long road to development.  
 
                                               
86 See for example Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007. 
87 See for example Birney 2014. 
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Table 1A: Does the household have any public good provided to it? 
 
 
Figure 1A: Provision Levels of Drains and Paved Streets  
 
 
